Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers to the Wrong Question by Blocher, Joseph
TH AL LAW JOURAL
COMMENT
Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Flawed Answers
to the Wrong Question
Prisoners of war (POWs) enjoy special rights under the Geneva
Conventions that "enemy combatants" detained in Guantinamo do not have,
including the right to be tried in the same courts and according to the same
procedures as members of the detaining power's armed forces? Under the
Geneva Conventions, captured combatants are entitled to POW status until
any doubt regarding their status has been properly adjudicated by a
"competent tribunal." 2 The U.S. government' and several commentators4 have
argued that the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), which were
established to determine the enemy combatant status of Guantinamo detainees
and which completed their work in March 2005, properly adjudicated the POW
status of the detainees.'
1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 102, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW].
2. Id. art. 5.
3. See Brief for the Respondents at 42 n.18, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No.
o5-184), available at http://www.hamdanvrumsfeld.com/HamdanSGmeritsbrief.pdf;
Gordon England, Sec'y of the Navy, Defense Department Special Briefing on Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (Mar. 29, 2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcriptS/2oos/
tr20050329-2382.html ("Justice O'Connor ... said [in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld] that one of the
remedies she felt was to have a process like Army Regulation 19o-8 [implementing Article
5]. So we have implemented that for all of the detainees. And as I said before, we've actually
gone beyond that.").
4. See, e.g., Douglas W. Kmiec, Observing the Separation of Powers: The President's War Power
Necessarily Remains "The Power To Wage War Successfully," 53 DRAKE L. REv. 851, 888
(2005); Paul Rosenzweig, On Liberty and Terror in the Post-9/11 World: A Response to Professor
Chemerinsky, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 29, 38 (2005).
5. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld did not reach the issue.
Hamdan confirmed that Guantfinamo detainees enjoy Geneva Convention protection but
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This Comment argues that the CSRTs were not competent to deny POW
status because they were charged only with identifying enemy combatants, a
broad category that by its own terms includes many POWs. Given the
substantial overlap between the definitions of "enemy combatant" and "POW,"
a CSRT's affirmative enemy combatant determination actually supports a
detainee's POW status. Thus, even after their enemy combatant status has
been adjudicated by the CSRTs, Guantinamo detainees should still be treated
as presumptive POWs.
Part I of this Comment discusses presumptive POW status and the
historical role of tribunals in adjudicating that status. Part II explains how
CSRTs depart from that tradition and why their enemy combatant
determinations cannot be used to rebut the Geneva Conventions' presumption
of POW status. The Comment concludes by suggesting solutions to the
dilemma posed by the overlapping definitions of "enemy combatant" and
"POW.",
I. PRESUMPTIVE AND CONCLUSIVE POW STATUS
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(GPW) governs the definition, classification, and treatment of POWs. 6 Under
Article 5 of the GPW, captured combatants whose status is in doubt are entitled
to POW status until a "competent tribunal" determines otherwise:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to
any of the categories enumerated in Article 4 [defining POWs], such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.7
Article 5 thus implicitly recognizes both presumptive POWs -detainees whose
status is in question but who have not yet had an Article 5 hearing-and
conclusive POWs, who have been expressly adjudicated as such.8 Unless and
until a competent tribunal determines otherwise, a detainee about whom any
explicitly reserved judgment on whether Salim Ahmed Hamdan's status as a "potential"
prisoner of war had been properly adjudicated. 126 S. Ct. at 2795 & n.61.
6. GPW, supra note 1.
7. Id. art. 5.
8. I owe many thanks to Stephen Vladeck for encouraging me to address this issue and for
clarifying my thinking on it.
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doubt exists remains a presumptive POW entitled to the full panoply of GPW
rights.
American military regulations and practice have historically recognized
presumptive POW status. For instance, Army Regulation 19o-8, which was
"adopted to implement the Geneva Convention,"9 echoes the language of
Article 5:
A competent tribunal shall determine the status of any person not
appearing to be entitled to prisoner of war status who has committed a
belligerent act or has engaged in hostile activities in aid of enemy armed
forces, and who asserts that he or she is entitled to treatment as a
prisoner of war, or concerning whom any doubt of a like nature exists."
During the Vietnam War, the Army implemented Regulation 19o-8 by
requiring an "Article 5 tribunal" to determine the POW status of each captured
Viet Cong belligerent." Consistent with the GPW's recognition of presumptive
POW status, the Army classified North Vietnamese and Viet Cong detainees as
POWs until such a tribunal reached a contrary conclusion." The United States
continued to convene Article 5 tribunals to resolve doubts about the POW
9. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 550 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring). Army Regulation
19o-8 cites the Geneva Conventions as the basis for its interpretation. Army Reg. 19o-8 § 1-
i(b) (1997), available at http://www.usapa.army.miVpdffiles/r19o_8.pdf.
1o. Army Reg. 19o-8 § 1-6(b); see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 538 ("[It is notable that military
regulations already provide for such process in related instances, dictating that tribunals be
made available to determine the status of enemy detainees who assert prisoner-of-war status
under the Geneva Convention."). U.S. military field manuals also recognize presumptive
POW status. See DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 27-1o, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
para. 71 (1956); see also DEP'T OF THE AIR FORCE, AIR FORCE PAMPHLET No. 110-31,
INTERNATIONAL LAw-THE CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS para. 3-
3(c)(2) (1976) ("Upon capture any person, who does not appear to be entitled to [prisoner
of war] status, but who had committed a belligerent act is required to be treated as a
[prisoner of war] until his status is properly determined.").
11. 6o DOCUMENTS ON PRISONERS OF WAR 722-31, 748-51 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1979)
(reproducing U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) Directive 381-46);
Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 754,
768 (1968) [hereinafter Contemporary Practice] (reproducing a portion of MACV Directive
20-5).
12. See Contemporary Practice, supra note 11, at 766-68 (reproducing MACV Directive 381-46,
annex A). Like the Taliban, the Viet Cong were initially denied POW status. See Daryl A.
Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions To Prosecute Individuals Accused of Terrorist Acts, 96
Aiv. J. INT'L L. 320, 326 (2002).
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status of combatants captured during the conflict in Grenada 3 and the Persian
Gulf War. 
14
II. THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN ENEMY COMBATANT AND POW
STATUS
At Guantinamo, the U.S. government has departed from its own long-held
practice. Rather than convening Article 5 tribunals to verify detainees' POW
status, the government has claimed that the CSRTs fulfilled Article 5's
mandate. But Article 5 tribunals and CSRTs exist for different purposes and
are charged with making different adjudications: whereas Article S tribunals
exist to determine POW status, the CSRTs were created to classify enemy
combatants.' 5 The CSRTs did not-and were never asked to-determine
detainees' POW status. Indeed, on at least one occasion, the Legal Advisor to
the Combatant Status Review Tribunals upheld a CSRT's refusal to hear
evidence relating to POW status because "Combatant Status Review Tribunals
do not have the discretion to determine that a detainee should be classified as a
prisoner of war -only whether the detainee satisfies the definition of 'enemy
combatant.....6 Furthermore, as explained above, a process must dispel doubt of
POW status in order to strip a detainee of protection as a presumptive POW.7
Because the CSRTs made no findings that disproved, or even addressed, POW
status, they were plainly insufficient to meet Article 5's mandate.
13. See JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TREATMENT OF "BATTLEFIELD DETAINEES" IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 37 (2oo6), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/
RL31367.pdf.
14. See DEP'T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 663
(1992), available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf. According to Department
of Defense documents, nearly 1200 tribunals "were conducted to verify status" during the
Persian Gulf War, 310 of which found that the detainee was entitled to conclusive POW
status. Id.
is. See Vijay Sekhon, More Questions than Answers: The Indeterminacy Surrounding Enemy
Combatants Following Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 9 CAL. CRiM. L. REV. 1, 15 (20o5); Neil A. Lewis,
Scrutiny of Review Tribunals as War Crimes Trials Open, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2004, at A12.
The CSRTs were established as a direct response to the Supreme Court's June 2004 ruling
in Hamdi that "a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant [must] be given a
meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral
decisionmaker." 542 U.S. at 509.
16. Memorandum from James R. Crisfield Jr., Legal Advisor, to Dir., Combatant Status Review
Tribunal 3 (Dec. 16, 2004), http://wid.ap.org/documents/detainees/ moazzambegg.pdf.
17. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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When Guant~inamo detainees and their lawyers raised this Article 5 issue in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 8 the government responded that the CSRTs had fulfilled
Article 5's requirements as a byproduct of adjudicating enemy combatant
status, and that detainees designated as enemy combatants thereby lost their
presumptive POW status. In its brief, the government argued that the CSRT
process "clearly discharges any obligation under Article 5." 9 Senator Lindsey
Graham went even further, labeling the CSRTs "Article 5 tribunals on
steroids." ° The government"1 and the scholars who supported its position"2
focused on the procedural protections available to detainees appearing before
the CSRTs. By doing so, they largely ignored a more fundamental point:
because of the substantial similarities between the definitions of "enemy
combatant" and "prisoner of war," classification as an enemy combatant by a
CSRT actually supports, rather than precludes, a finding of POW status. Thus,
the CSRTs could not strip detainees of their presumptive POW status simply
by finding them to be enemy combatants.
The Bush Administration has defined an enemy combatant as anyone "who
was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that
are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.
This definition includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has
directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces." 3 Courts have
noted that this definition is "vague and overly broad."' In addition to covering
a "little old lady in Switzerland who writes checks to what she thinks is a
charity that helps orphans in Afghanistan but [what] really is a front to finance
al-Qaeda activities,"2 the expansive definition includes persons clearly covered
by Article 4 of the GPW, which defines prisoners of war.
18. Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 18 n.36, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No.
o5-184), available at http://www.hanidanvrumsfeld.conV/AMDANFINAL.march'5.reply.pdf.
The author worked as research assistant to Professor Neal Katyal, who represented Hamdan
before the Supreme Court. The opinions expressed in this Comment are the author's alone
and do not represent those of Professor Katyal or the Hamdan litigation team.
19. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 3, at 42.
20. 151 CONG. REC. S12,754 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Graham).
21. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 3, at 42 n.18 ("The CSRT was patterned after the
'competent tribunal' described in Geneva Convention Article 5 and Army Regulation 19o-8
•.. but provides more process.").
22. See, e.g., Kmiec, supra note 4, at 888-89.
23. Dep't of Def., Guantanamo Detainee Processes 2 (June 9, 20o6), http://www.defenselink.
mil/news/Sep2oo 5/d2005o9o8process.pdf [hereinafter Guantanamo Detainee Processes].
24. E.g., In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 474 (D.D.C. 2005).
25. Id. at 475 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Article 4(A)(1) of the GPW extends POW status to "[m]embers of the
armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. ''26 This definition covers
both the Taliban-which the Bush Administration has acknowledged is
protected by the Geneva Convention27- and units of al Qaeda, to the degree
that they formed part of Taliban armed forces. 8 The Taliban's reliance on
shifting alliances with independent groups and warlords indicates that units or
members of al Qaeda may have acted as part of the Taliban armed forces,
bringing them within the plain language of Article 4(A)(1).2 9 Indeed, the
government has repeatedly recognized, and even argued, that the Taliban and
al Qaeda were "tied tightly at the waist" and "functioned" together.3" The
second relevant POW category, defined in Article 4(A) (4), grants POW status
to "[p]ersons who accompany the armed forces without actually being
members thereof."'3' This broad category appears to cover support personnel
such as drivers or medics." Moreover, Article 5 essentially extends the reach of
these categories by granting POW status to detainees about whom any doubt
exists.
26. GPW, supra note i, art. 4(A)(1).
27. Office of the White House Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb.
7, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2oo2/o2/2002o2o7-13.html ("[T]he
Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban detainees."); see also Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift
Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 2002, at An.
28. In a memorandum circulated on July 7, 2006, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England
announced that the detainees at Guantinamo must be treated in accordance with Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, but he noted that "aside from the military commission
procedures," which the Court had invalidated in Hamdan, "existing DoD orders, policies,
directives, execute orders, and doctrine comply with the standards of Common Article 3."
Memorandum from Gordon England, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to Sec'ys of the Military Dep'ts
et al. (July 7, 20o6), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/genevaconsmemo.pdf. It appears,
therefore, that the problems this Comment identifies with the CSRTs and Article 5 will not
be addressed in the response to this most recent memorandum.
29. See Thom Shanker & Steven Lee Myers, U.S. Special Forces Step Up Campaign in Afghan
Areas, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 19, 20ol, at Ai (discussing "alliances of convenience"). For example,
al Qaeda reportedly aided the Taliban military in its struggle against the Northern Alliance.
See ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL Q.AEDA 58-60 (2002).
30. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Sec'y of Def., Remarks on Ferry from Air Terminal to Main Base,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Jan. 27, 2002), http://www.defenselink.m/transcripts/2oo2/
t01282002_t0127sd2.html.
31. GPW, supra note I, art. 4(A)(4).
32. Salim Ahmed Hamdan, the petitioner in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (20o6), was
allegedly a driver for Osama bin Laden. See Andrew Zajac, Free Hand Urged for Tribunal; Bin
Laden Driver's Case Could Affect Detainee Prosecutions, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 2005, at 20.
672
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
116:667 2006
COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS
The newly created definition of "enemy combatant" fails to exclude these
POW categories and, as a result, its application by the CSRTs cannot be used
to justify denial of POW status. To take one clear example, the definition of
"enemy combatant" includes any "individual who was part of or supporting
Taliban or al Oaeda forces."33 By its plain terms, this would include even the
most obvious example of a prisoner of war defined in Article 4 (A)(i)-
"[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict." Similarly, the broad
definition of "enemy combatant," including those "supporting Taliban or al
Qaeda forces," also covers Article 4 (A)( 4 ) POWs "who accompany the armed
forces without actually being members thereof." Though the administration
has recognized that "the Geneva Convention applies to the Taliban
detainees, it has simultaneously denied them POW status based on their
membership in the Taliban, which the government says qualifies them as
enemy combatants. In fact, Department of Defense documents show that fully
5o% of detainees appearing before the CSRTs were alleged to be either Taliban
or both al Qaeda and Taliban.3 s The CSRTs' own publicized findings confirm
that members of the Taliban were classified as enemy combatants based at least
in part on their membership in the Taliban. 
6
Even if the CSRTs had been empowered to affirmatively grant POW
status, the overlap between the definitions of "enemy combatant" and
"prisoner of war" would have presented detainees with a paralyzing Catch-22.
If a detainee treated the tribunal as an Article 5 proceeding and tried to
establish POW status-by demonstrating membership in the Taliban armed
forces, for example-he would simultaneously prove himself to be an
33. Guantanamo Detainee Processes, supra note 23, at 2.
34. Office of the White House Press Sec'y, supra note 27.
35. Mark Denbeaux & Joshua Denbeaux, The Guantanamo Detainees: The Government's Story
8, http://aw.shu.edu/news/guantanamo-report-final_2 o8 o6.pdf (last visited Nov. 8,
2oo6). For the voluminous, though partially redacted, proceedings of the CSRTs, see U.S.
Dep't of Def., Documents Concerning Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT)
Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba,
http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees (last visited Nov. 8, 20o6).
36. See Unclassified Summary of Basis for Tribunal Decision, at NOVooo9l,
http://www.dod.miVpubs/foi/detainees/CSRTJTF-GTMO-documents.pdf (last visited
Nov. 8, 20o6) ("[T]his Detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant and is a
member of, or affiliated with, A] Qaida and the Taliban."); id. at NOVooioo (upholding an
enemy combatant determination because, among other things, the "detainee voluntarily
joined the Taliban" and "the detainee agreed to fight with the Taliban"); id. at NOVooin5
("[T]his detainee is properly classified as an enemy combatant and was part of or
supporting Taliban and Al Qaida forces."); id. at NOVoo147 ("[T]his detainee is properly
classified as an enemy combatant and was part of or supporting Taliban forces, or associated
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.").
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"individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces" and thus
an enemy combatant, which, the government would argue, precluded POW
status. Conversely, if a detainee treated the tribunal as a CSRT and tried to
avoid the enemy combatant label -by denying involvement with the Taliban,
for example-he would simultaneously give up the chance to establish POW
status as a member of a hostile armed force. In effect, the only way out of the
dilemma would be to deny any involvement with the Taliban or al Qaeda, even
though membership in the former would entitle the detainee to POW status
under both Article 4 and the Bush Administration's own public statements.
CONCLUSION
The CSRTs have completed their work and have been disbanded, but the
impact of their findings remains unclear. This Comment has argued that
irrespective of their procedural protections or the accuracy with which they
identified "enemy combatants," the CSRTs did not fulfill Article 5's mandate.
As a result, they did not and could not strip detainees of their presumptive
POW status. Ironically, the CSRTs' enemy combatant determinations actually
provide a relatively solid basis for transforming presumptive POWs into
conclusive POWs.
If the Bush Administration truly wants to vindicate Article 5, the solution is
straightforward: disentangle the definitions of "enemy combatant" and
"prisoner of war," and establish tribunals to determine the latter. To separate
the definitions, the simplest solution would be to narrow the ever-expanding
definition of "enemy combatant" so that it would correspond with "unlawful
combatant," the term used in the GPW to refer to combatants who do not fall
within any of Article 4's categories. This change would obviate the need for
separate tribunals and would boil the question down to the single inquiry
contemplated by the GPW: whether a detainee was entitled to POW status
under Article 4. Until competent tribunals answer this question in accordance
with Article 5, the Guantinamo detainees remain presumptive POWs, and
courts considering the post-Hamdan Guantinamo cases should treat them as
such.
As Congress and the executive create new tribunals in Guantfinamo, Iraq, or
elsewhere, they must consider more than just the legislative authorization and
procedural protections required by Hamdan. This Comment suggests that to
give full effect to the Geneva Conventions, Congress must first disentangle the
definitions of "enemy combatant" and "prisoner of war." Procedural changes
alone are not an answer when the tribunals begin with the wrong question.
JOSEPH BLOCHER
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